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Abstract  
       Earthquakes are one of the major disasters that require a holistic approach in crisis 
management strategies owing to their devastating effects. However, the continuing incapability of 
some countries learning from earthquakes poses a major policy problem for disaster reduction and 
response. Up until the Marmara Earthquake, Turkey was one of these countries. This paper 
examines the conditions and characteristics contributing to the massive 1999 Marmara earthquake 
that devastated the country in a large scale and resulted in many casualties, never seen before in its 
history. It also focuses on the response of the government to this earthquake and lessons learnt 
from the disaster in terms of preparedness as well as processes of mitigation, response and 
recovery. It tries to explain the conditions that lead to changes in a wide range of areas from 
insurance of buildings to their construction standards realized by the government in order to 
reduce its vulnerability to future disasters. 
 
Keywords: Disaster, earthquake, the Marmara earthquake, risk management, disaster 
management. 
 
 
I-Introduction 
       Disasters are abrupt, calamitous and mostly unexpected events that result in great casualty and 
damage, whether through natural or man-made causes. They take place across the world in every 
form of natural, man-made or combination of both (Oral & Dönmez, 2010). In general, disasters 
entail an enormous number of victims and cause a devastating effect on the economies of 
countries. They also challenge the rapid response ability of the public and the government and 
require taking sufficient steps so as to manage them effectively.  
Response to disasters follows a crisis management cycle that includes specific aspects of a 
disaster, with an open ended process. There are four phases in this cycle: mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. Mitigation comprises a broad range of measures that prevent a disaster, 
lessens the chance of a disaster occurrence or reduces the detrimental effects of unavoidable 
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disasters. Preparedness, as the second phase, implies efforts in increase readiness for a disaster and 
focuses on ensuring the community is prepared to react to any hazard that endangers the certain 
location. Response is the activity undertaken just before, during and immediately after a disaster in 
order to protect life and property. As the last phase, recovery is the action that aims at returning the 
impacted community to a pre-disaster status or to an improved situation after a disaster. This is a 
very daunting phase of the crisis management since it entails community as well as personal 
motivation (AthenaGlobal, 2004). 
The crisis management is particularly essential to evaluate susceptibility, danger, risk, and 
coping ability and strategy through participatory processes, and to achieve consensus within the 
state institutions on actions required. In the crisis management, mitigation strategies and coping 
mechanisms may vary from disaster to disaster. These should aim at reducing vulnerability to crisis 
institutions face with regard to various natural disasters and strengthening their capacity to deal 
with it. The primary objective of crisis management is to handle a crisis timely and effectively as 
well as help the government and its agencies curtail the damage caused by any disaster. Additionally, 
in any crisis management strategy, providing information to the communities via the media is so 
vital that it helps mobilize their own coping mechanisms to deal with any disaster (Olson & Wu, 
2008). 
Earthquakes are one of those major disasters that require a holistic approach in crisis 
management strategies due to their devastating effects. However, the continuing incapability of 
some countries learning from earthquakes poses a major policy problem for disaster reduction and 
response. Up until the Marmara Earthquake, Turkey was one of these countries. This paper 
examines the conditions and characteristics contributing to the massive 1999 Marmara earthquake 
that devastated the country in a large scale and resulted in many casualties, never seen before in its 
history (Comfort & Sungu, 2002). It also focuses on the response of the government to this 
earthquake and lessons learnt from the disaster in terms of preparedness as well as processes of 
mitigation, response and recovery. It tries to explain the conditions that lead to changes in a wide 
range of areas from insurance of buildings to their construction standards, realized by the 
government in order to reduce its vulnerability to future disasters.  
 
II- Turkey and Earthquakes 
       Turkey is located in one of the most active seismic zones in the world. More than 95 percent 
of the country’s land mass is prone to earthquakes. The areas in which large-scale earthquakes can 
strike at any time include 75 percent of industrial facilities and 70 percent of the population. Since 
1894, direct infrastructure and property losses stemming from earthquakes have normally surpassed 
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5 billion US dollars and, in the case of the 1939 Erzincan earthquake, have attained $23 billion 
(Gurenko, Lester, Mahul, & Gonulal, 2006). 
On the other hand, although Turkey is subject to frequent earthquakes, most significantly from 
the North Anatolian Fault Zone, which stretches across the country and is responsible for many of 
the Turkey’s largest historical earthquakes, it was not well prepared for any large scale earthquake 
causing significant causalities and devastation. The Turkish officials, evidently, knew that in 
comparison with other natural disasters, earthquakes have always been the most devastating and 
frequent ones in Turkey. According to the records and statistical figures of the last 70 years, the 
average annual loss from earthquakes alone amount to 0,8 percent of the national income, whilst 
the ratio of the other natural disasters is 0,2 percent (Erdik, 1999). Considering the building 
damages owing to natural disasters in Turkey over the last 60 years, 62 percent of the total loss has 
been related to the earthquakes (Komisyonu, 1999). Despite the fact that the fault system has been 
well documented and researched, up until the Marmara earthquake, governments did not pay 
attention to high probability of a large earthquake in this region (Isbir & Genc, 2006). And also, 
albeit many cities were devastated by the earthquakes, they, nonetheless, were rebuilt on the same 
or close locations. According to the data, while 44 percent of the total population of Turkey 
inhabits in the first degree earthquake zone, 26 percent and 15 percent of the population lives in the 
second and in the third degree zones, respectively (Özmen, Güler, & Nurlu, 1997). Even Istanbul, 
which suffered major earthquakes and is now the largest city in Turkey, is also located in the first 
degree earthquake zone (Isbir & Genc, 2006). 
 
III- The Marmara Earthquake 
      On August 17, 1999, at about 3:02 am local time, northwestern Turkey, which is called as the 
Marmara region, was hit by a major earthquake. Lasting for 45 seconds, the earthquake was a 7.4 
magnitude on the Richter scale and its epicenter was located in Kocaeli, approximately 70 
kilometers from Istanbul. The earthquake also caused a tsunami in the Sea of Marmara that was 
about 3 meters high (WorldBank, 1999).  
An official Turkish report placed the death toll at 18,373. At the same time 48,901 people were 
injured (Ewing, Kruse, Ozdemir, & Narayana, 2004). Reportedly 2,000 buildings collapsed, 120,000 
poorly engineered houses were damaged beyond repair, and 50,000 houses were heavily damaged. 
The earthquake also left 600,000 people homeless (Comfort & Sungu, 2002). 
The Marmara earthquake delivered a heavy blow to the Turkish economy in this densely 
populated urban and industrialized area of the country. Because of its production and consumption 
capacity, the Marmara region is very significant to the Turkish economy. The region is the center of 
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the Turkish oil, textile, automobile, petrochemical, and tire industries and produces 46.7 percent of 
total industry value added (DIE, 2000). The seven cities hit by the earthquake, Istanbul, Kocaeli, 
Sakarya, Yalova, Bolu, Bursa, and Eskisehir, comprise 23 percent of the total population of Turkey 
and generate 33.4 percent of the Turkish GDP (DIE, 2000). 
In this context, a myriad of factories and industrial units were hit by the earthquake, including 
several automotive plants and oil refineries. The Turkish navy headquarters in Gölcük, Kocaeli was 
also heavily devastated. All of these increased the severity of the loss of life and property. The 
earthquake caused a subsequent fire owing to a collapse of a tower in a Tüpraş oil refinery, which 
had over 700,000 tons of oil stored. It took several days to get the fire under control. The 
earthquake also brought about a considerable damage in Istanbul. Destruction here mainly 
occurred in the Avcılar district, which is on the fault line that stretches across the Marmara Sea. 
Avcılar was built on ground mainly comprised of sea soil at the bottom level, which renders this 
district vulnerable to any earthquake (Reilinger et al., 2000).  
Turkey’s infrastructure, enterprise sector, social infrastructure, and financial systems were also 
severely affected by the Marmara earthquake, which particularly hard hit the energy, transport, and 
telecommunications sectors, due to their high concentration near the epicenter. Besides the 3,400 
electricity distribution towers and 490 kilometers of overhead cables that were affected form the 
earthquake, many kilometers of underground cables were destroyed or damaged. Over 60 
kilometers of the Ankara-Istanbul highway, the Gebze-Izmit-Arifiye railroad, and ports and jetties 
in the area were destroyed. In Adapazari, a main rail factory also collapsed. Damage to pipelines 
and refineries brought about environmental catastrophe (Gurenko et al., 2006). The indirect 
economic impact of the earthquake on the private sector as well as financial infrastructure was also 
significant. Losses stemming from uninsured damage led to many nonperforming loans. Despite 
the fact that assessment of overall economic cost of the Marmara earthquake vary considerably, 
both direct and indirect costs were calculated at least 10-15 billion US dollars, an amount that is 
equal to about five-seven percent of the GDP (DIE, 2000). 
 
IV- Overview of Response Activities after Earthquake 
     As soon as the earthquake hit, search and rescue activities were conducted by surviving family 
members and neighbors themselves. Within 24 hours of the disaster, tens of members of AKUT, 
the Turkish civilian voluntary search and rescue group, initiated search and rescue activities, and 
various aid teams from 24 countries with approximately a thousand personnel participated within 
48 hours. Interestingly, as the most organized institution in the Turkish state structure, the 
Turkish military did not participate in the first two days of the search and rescue operations in the 
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disaster area. Having drawn much criticism from the public for being late, the Turkish military 
began its search and rescue activities with 50,000 troops in the third day yet after the earthquake 
struck (Mitchell, 2000).  
In spite of the fact that the crisis management centre of the Prime Ministry allegedly initiated 
its emergency response activities in a few-hour period following the earthquake, however, 
response to the disaster by the officials and relevant agencies in the earthquake area were awfully 
slow and ineffective. Because of the lack of a comprehensive plan and coordination, which is 
essential to increasing the effectiveness of aid and assistance in such kind of disasters, delivery of 
food and water was extremely slow; therefore, large amounts of spoiled bread and other food 
which was uneaten created huge piles of garbage in the disaster area. Owing to the traffic 
conditions, in the first and second days highways and main roads were extremely congested. Only 
in the third day of the earthquake heavy machinery sent by the Turkish government was brought 
in to help remove the debris. Even though the heavy machinery was provided largely from the 
stricken north-western region, because of the dire need, some was procured from as far as 600 
km away. Considering the chaotic situation on the ground, the Turkish government appealed to 
the international community to provide humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction assistance to 
be able to cope with the disaster (Isbir & Genc, 2006).  
It should be noted here that although there was a total chaos in the first days of the disaster, it 
did not occur any noteworthy criminal incident, and the local police was fairly better responsive to 
the earthquake victims than the other governmental institutional. Immediately following the 
earthquake, one of the most effective institutions in the earthquake area was the police force. Soon 
after the disaster, The Turkish National Police (TNP) established a crisis management center in its 
headquarters. Through its special communication infrastructure, this center was in contact with the 
local police departments in the disaster area, and assisted the other government departments in 
communicating with their local units within the quake zone. The TNP was also quick to dispatch 
additional personnel from other regions of the country to help local police departments provide 
public order and implement other necessary tasks related to the relief efforts.  
 
V- After the Earthquake: What Went Wrong?  
     In addition to the vast extent of the damage caused by the earthquake, inadequate planning, lack 
of experience, resources, and ineffective leadership prevented the efficient initial launching of an 
emergency response in the form of crisis management activities. So much so that the first several 
days subsequent to the disaster demonstrated that the government was not able to tackle the 
disaster in an effective way, and was extremely slow and inefficient in its crisis management efforts 
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as well as search and rescue activities. Control and authority was very limited at all levels in the first 
days of the earthquake and as a result, there was a total chaos in the disaster areas. It was even 
reported that as there was no backup facility for the telecommunication lines between Ankara and 
Istanbul. The President and the Prime Minister were not be able to be communicate with each 
other for a four-hour period on the day of the disaster (Isbir & Genc, 2006).  
According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies , although 
50,000 people were rescued from beneath rubble in the first days of the Marmara earthquake, 98 
percent of these were rescued by local residents, and this is obviously a stark reminder of how the 
government was unprepared for a disaster that was so large a scale and could not do its job in terms 
of search and rescue activities (IFRC, 2003). 
A few months after the disaster, an approximately 600,000 people were in a situation of dire 
and immediate need for shelter, and the approaching winter only exacerbated the problem. In order 
to provide accommodation for these people, along with private institutions the government set up 
80,000 tents, many of which, however, were nothing more than a piece of plastic tied across 
wooden frames (WorldBank, 2007). The government was caught unprepared once again, and quite 
similar to the other activities following the earthquake, it displayed its incompetency once again.  
Due to all these developments after the disaster, in the first weeks, victims of the earthquake 
were anxious about what the future would look like for them. Due to the trauma and stress 
associated with such a catastrophe, they completely lost their confidence in the government’ ability 
to help them. Some people were even terrified of returning to their undamaged homes in the first 
couple of weeks following the disaster. 
 
VI- Lessons Learned 
Following the earthquake, the Turkish government concluded that one of the most important 
priorities in the area of national catastrophic risk management entailed placing new mitigation 
policies and measures.  This, in turn, provided strong incentives to include improvements in the 
enforcement of the construction code, and thereby promoting safer construction practices. For this 
purpose, old legislation relating to construction practices was all amended and a number of new 
safety conditions were put into practice.  
Because the sheer number of people affected by the earthquake was overwhelming, the 
government embarked on sponsoring the construction of low-cost apartments to provide 
accommodation for 200,000 people who were left without homes. According to the first estimate, 
half of the damaged residences, roughly 150,000, could be refurbished and that the cost of repairing 
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and reconstructing buildings would account for between US$750m and US$1.2b (WorldBank, 
2007). 
On the other hand, disaster victims were still living in tents ten months later when the 
government started building the apartments. A total 34,000 apartments were constructed within 
two years of the Marmara earthquake. All the construction projects were prepared within the 
structure of a comprehensive program which accounted for US$1.8 billion, and were developed by 
the World Bank, together with the European Union, the United Nations Development Program, 
the European Investment Bank, and wide range of the Turkish governmental institutions.  Due to 
its previous assistance in the area of disaster recovery and management with two projects, the 
World Bank was very instrumental in providing support to Turkey (WorldBank, 2007). According 
to the new code of construction standards, all types of modern facilities and amenities such as, 
electricity, sewage systems, natural gas and parking were considered when these complexes were 
constructed. They were well planned with sidewalks, street lighting and tarmac roads. The 
apartments themselves have sufficient ventilation to protect inhabitants from extreme temperatures 
and at the same time benefit from natural light. There are also schools, health centers and grocery 
stores. 
After the Marmara earthquake, the government took action with setting up an important 
disaster preparedness program. Along with other subjects, this program comprised the training of 
government staff and volunteers in disaster response, logistics and telecommunications. The 
government also restocked warehouses with relief shelter and goods, and launched a public 
education campaign on what to do if an earthquake hits. Because what happened during the 
earthquake regarding search and rescue activities was in its mind, military formed a new 
organization within its structure in order to better response emergency calls (Isbir & Genc, 2006). 
The wounds needed to be healed not only physically but also psychologically for the survivors 
of the earthquake. In response to the need of disaster victims for special assistance in overcoming 
the trauma caused by this devastating earthquake and putting their lives back together, the 
government set up an important psycho-social support program. The program included the 
establishment of four centers in the earthquake areas.  
Last but not least, the exceptionally high financial costs of the Marmara earthquake induced the 
government to embrace a more fiscally efficient approach to financing earthquake losses. With this 
aim the government targeted to realize financial sustainability in the long term, thereby curtailing 
the government’s obligation to afford post-disaster emergency relief to the owners of dwellings. 
After examining the current international practice with catastrophe insurance funds, the Turkish 
government decided that the Turkish Catastrophic Insurance Pool (TCIP) should be obligatory for 
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all homeowners with coverage affordable for most homeowners and with adequate claims-paying 
capacity to significantly reduce the government’s fiscal exposure to catastrophe risk. This required 
an amendment to Disaster Law No. 7296, under which the government obliged to finance 
reconstruction of all houses destroyed by natural disasters. The law was amended twice in 1999 and 
2001, respectively and thus, the government’s obligation to provide housing reconstruction credits 
for registered urban housing after an earthquake ceased (Gurenko et al., 2006). 
 
VII- Conclusion 
The Marmara earthquake presents a rare opportunity to examine what went wrong in response 
to the disaster and why the relevant governmental institutions as well as officials were not well 
prepared for such kind of disaster in Turkey, in spite of the fact that geographically a major part of 
Turkey is located in the earthquake zones and most of its population is settled in these areas.  
This disaster also revealed that if the necessary measures had been taken in advance, many lives 
could have been saved. It is obvious that measures that were required to be in practice in order to 
avoid such catastrophic results were neglected or ignored by the government. Firstly, due to the 
lack of sufficient control mechanism and enforcement, inadequately designed and constructed 
buildings were easily collapsed. Secondly, because of the lack of professional teams, there were not 
sufficient search and rescue activities in the disaster area. Thirdly, a lack of housing insurance 
mechanism, as a compensation fund for the cost of the earthquake, resulted in a huge financial loss. 
Fourthly, although the country is located on one of the most active seismic zones in the world, 
there was no serious disaster preparedness education program in schools. Finally, government 
authorities and officials caught unprepared for the disaster, and albeit they were in dire need of 
communication, they were unable to communicate with one another, due to the lack of technical 
infrastructure. 
Having this experience in its mind, since the Marmara earthquake, Turkey has achieved great 
progress in setting up an important disaster preparedness program in the areas of: promoting safer 
construction practices and putting a number of new safety conditions into practice; training of 
government staff and volunteers in disaster response, logistics and telecommunications; launching a 
public education campaign on what to do if an earthquake hits; restocking warehouses with relief 
shelter and goods; establishing facilities for special assistance in overcoming the trauma caused by 
this devastating earthquake; and building its catastrophe reserves and bringing its claims-paying 
capacity to a level equal to the minimum investment grade rating.  
Finally, mobilizing aid to help earthquake victims in the devastated communities in the disaster 
area entailed essentially the exchange of information within the communities themselves as well as 
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between the communities and the government in Ankara. In addition, multiple exchanges occurred 
between the damaged communities and private and nonprofit organizations at local, national and 
international levels. These exchanges at all levels provided the opportunity to learn experiences for 
officials that paved the way for analyzing major challenges and therefore, maximizing their abilities 
for future disasters similar to the Marmara earthquake. Hence, the set of interactions among 
individuals, groups and organizations participating in disaster response operations subsequent to 
the Marmara earthquake helped officials adapt themselves to possible future earthquakes in Turkey. 
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